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Abstract
We consider a social optimization model of pricing scheme in single-minded auctions, in cases
where Walrasian equilibrium does not exist. We are interested in the maximization of the ratio, R, of
happy bidders over all agents, in a feasible allocation-pricing scheme. We show NP-hardness of the
optimization problem, establish lower and upper bounds of R, as well as develop greedy algorithms
to approximate the optimal value of R.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The algorithms of computing equilibria in an economy model have been adopted as one
of the most signiﬁcant research considerations in computational economics [6]. Among
various equilibrium models,Walrasian equilibrium is a traditional deﬁnition of equilibrium
with wonderful characteristics. In this work, we mainly consider the algorithmic issues of
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approximatingWalrasian equilibrium in the combinatorial auction, which is another impor-
tant research area that has attracted much attention [12] recently. In a combinatorial auction,
the auctioneer sells heterogeneous types of indivisible commodities to some bidders. Dif-
ferent from traditional auctions, the bidders in a combinatorial auction bid on combinations
of commodities. In general, each bidder can use a value function to represent his/her bids
on bundles of commodities, which maps from the collection of all subsets of commodities
toR+. In this paper, we concentrate on a subclass of combinatorial auctions, single-minded
auctions. Bidders in this kind of auction are all single-minded bidders: they only bid on a
certain bundle of auctioned items. Hence their value functions are greatly simpliﬁed. Al-
though with a very simple form, this kind of auction is so powerful that every combinatorial
auction can be converted to a single-minded auction by introducing virtual bidders and
virtual commodities [10].
In a combinatorial auction, aWalrasian equilibriumcan be viewed as an allocation-pricing
scheme satisfying the following conditions:
• Each commodity is assigned a price, and the price of a bundle is the summation of the
prices of all commodities in that bundle.
• Any unallocated commodity is assigned a price of value zero.
• Under these prices, the speciﬁc allocation guarantees that every bidder cannot gain more
utility by any other allocation.
Kelso and Crawford [9] ﬁrst proved the existence of Walrasian equilibrium under a cer-
tain condition. Later, Bikhchandani and Mamer [2] established a necessary and sufﬁcient
condition for the existence of Walrasian equilibrium by the duality theorem in linear pro-
gramming. Recently, Chen et al. [4] studied the algorithmic issues ofWalrasian equilibrium
in single-minded auctions and proved that deciding the existence of Walrasian equilibrium
in single-minded auctions is NP-hard.
Naturally, people will resort to approximating equilibrium in some sense. Postlewaite
and Schmeidler [11] considered one of the possible approximation directions. They deﬁned
-Walrasian equilibrium which means every bidder is almost satisﬁed within a ratio (1− )
instead of the absolute satisfaction in normal Walrasian equilibriums.
In this paper, we consider the approximation in another direction inspired by the concept
in the work of Demange [5] and Hansen and Thisse [8], which characterized the majority
equilibrium in voting process. Informally speaking, in the decision making problem of
public affairs, people would like to make decisions by voting with majority rule. In such a
voting process, a majority equilibrium is a solution with the property that no other solutions
can pleasemore than half of the voters in comparison to it. Recently,Chen et al. [3] developed
a fast algorithm to achieve the equilibrium for the cases with nice structures and proved the
NP-hardness for the general case.
Similarly, regarding the auction as a special kind of voting, we aim to maximize the
number of satisﬁed bidders instead of making every bidder approximately satisﬁed. In this
way, we obtain a ratio R which is deﬁned to be the maximal fraction of satisﬁed bidders
in a single-minded auction. We observe that if no restrictions are placed on single-minded
auctions, the ratio R cannot be satisfactorily high when the number of commodities m
increases. Even if we require the number of commodities and the number of bidders to be
approximately equal, we still cannot guarantee a satisfactory lower bound of R. We try to
estimate the lower bound of R and get some positive results for small m.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some necessary pre-
liminaries and the formal deﬁnition of our problem. In Section 3, we give an NP-hardness
proof for the optimization problem of maximizing R. We study the upper and lower bounds
of R and provide a greedy algorithm to approximate the optimal value of R.
2. Model and deﬁnitions
A combinatorial auction is a triple (, I, V ) which consists of the following issues:
• Commodities: The auctioneer sells m indivisible commodities in the market. Let  =
{1, . . . ,m} denote the set of commodities.
• Agents: There are n agents in the market acting as bidders, denoted by I = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• Value functions: Each bidder i ∈ I has a value function vi : 2 → R+ to submit his bids
on bundles of commodities. Denote all bidders’value functions by V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}.
In this paper, we concentrate on single-minded auctions. In a single-minded auction, each
bidder is only interested in his basic bundle. More precisely, for a single-minded bidder i,
there exists a subset i ⊆  and a positive number wi such that his value function vi is
deﬁned by
vi(E) =
{
wi if E = i ,
0 otherwise.
If we denote a subset of  by a 0–1 vector in Rm, then it is natural to represent a single-
minded bidder’s value function by a pair (a,w) where a ∈ {0, 1}m is the bidder’s basic
bundle andw ∈ R is his bid on his basic bundle. From now on,w will be called the bidder’s
budget. With these notations, a single-minded auction can be represented by a pair (A,w),
where A = (aij ) is a m× n matrix whose ith column ai is the basic bundle of bidder i and
w = (wi) ∈ Rn is the bidders’ budget vector.
Let 〈·, ·〉 denote the inner product of two vectors. Let e denote the vector of all 1’s whose
dimension is clear within the context.
An allocation x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)T is an n-dimensional 0–1 vector whose ith entry is 1
if and only if bidder i wins his basic bundle. The social welfare of this allocation is deﬁned
by 〈w, x〉. An allocation x is feasible if Axe which ensures every commodity is sold to
at most one bidder.
A price vector p is a nonnegative vector in Rm whose jth entry is the price of good j .
Deﬁne the utility of bidder i under an allocation x and price p by
ui(x, p) =
{
wi − 〈ai, p〉 if xi = 1,
0 if xi = 0.
A bidder is satisﬁed under an allocation x and price p if he cannot gain more utility in any
other allocation xˆ. Obviously, bidder i is a satisﬁed winner (loser) if and only ifwi〈ai, p〉
(wi〈ai, p〉).
Deﬁnition 1 (Gul and Stacchetti [7]). For a single-minded combinatorial auction (A,w),
a Walrasian equilibrium is a tuple (x, p), where x is a feasible allocation and p is a price
vector, satisfying that every bidder is satisﬁed and 〈p,Ax〉 = 〈p, e〉.
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The condition 〈p,Ax〉 = 〈p, e〉 is referred as market clearing price in the literature.
Example 1 (An example of Walrasian equilibrium). There are three bidders {1, 2, 3} and
three commodities {1,2,3} in the auction. Their value functions are
{
(1, 1, 0)T, 6
}
,{
(1, 0, 1)T, 2
}
and
{
(0, 1, 1)T, 3
}
, respectively. Then setting the allocation vector as x =
(1, 0, 0)T and price vector as (2, 3, 0)T will satisfy all of the three bidders. However, if
the second bidder’s budget is raised to 4, there is no Walrasian equilibrium in such an
auction.
In general, Walrasian equilibrium may not exist [2,4]. With this undesirable fact, Postle-
waite and Schmeidler [11] deﬁned -Walrasian equilibrium which means every bidder
is satisﬁed in (1 − ) sense instead of the absolute satisfaction in Walrasian equilib-
rium. In this paper, we try to relax the constraints in the deﬁnition of equilibriums in
another way:
Deﬁnition 2. For a single-minded auction (A,w), a feasible allocation-pricing scheme is
a tuple (x, p), where x is a feasible allocation and p is a price vector, satisfying that every
winner is satisﬁed and 〈p,Ax〉 = 〈p, e〉.
Such a scheme always exists in a single-minded auction since any feasible allocation
with prices of value zero can make all winners satisﬁed.
Given a feasible allocation-pricing scheme (x, p) in a single-minded auction (A,w),
denote by s(x, p) the number of satisﬁed bidders and r(x, p) = s(x, p)/n.
Deﬁnition 3. For a single-minded auction (A,w), a semi-Walrasian equilibrium is a fea-
sible allocation-pricing scheme (x∗, p∗) which maximizes the function s(x, p). Deﬁne
S(A,w) = s(x∗, p∗), R(A,w) = r(x∗, p∗).
It is well known that Walrasian equilibrium leads to a maximum of social welfare [4].
However, the following example shows that it is not true for semi-Walrasian equilibrium:
Example 2. There are three commodities {1,2,3} in the market. Bidder 1’s value
function is
{
(1, 1, 0)T, 6
}
. Bidders 2 and 3 share a value function
{
(1, 0, 1)T, 4
}
. Bid-
ders 4 and 5 share a value function
{
(0, 1, 1)T, 4
}
. Allocating {1,2} to bidder 1 will
maximize the social welfare. But it can satisfy at most three bidders, whatever the prices
are. On the other hand, allocating {1,3} to bidder 2 and setting p = (0, 0, 4)T will
satisfy four bidders. It is a semi-Walrasian equilibrium, but the social welfare is not
maximal.
3. NP-hardness of the problem
SinceWalrasian equilibrium may not exist in general, it becomes an interesting problem
to investigate when the equilibrium exists. Chen et al. [4] proved that the decision problem
about the existence of an equilibrium is NP-hard:
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Lemma 1 (Chen et al. [4]). Given any single-minded auction, it is NP-hard to determine
whether there exists a Walrasian equilibrium.
We try to ﬁnd a generalization of their result from Walrasian equilibrium to semi-
Walrasian equilibrium. Obviously,R(A,w) = 1 if and only ifWalrasian equilibrium exists.
Hence as a corollary of Lemma 1, the optimization version of maximizing r(x, p) is NP-
hard. The following theorem shows that its decision version is also NP-hard for any small
constant c:
Theorem 1. For any constant 0 < c1, it isNP-hard to determine whetherR(A,w) > c.
Before the proof of this theorem, we need a lemma:
Lemma 2. For any positive integer n, there exists an auction (An,n) with n bidders and
n(n− 1)/2 commodities such that S(An,wn) = 2.
Proof. Let I = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of bidders and the budget of each bidder is 1. For
any two bidders i and j (i < j ), introduce a commodity ij . Hence the set of commodi-
ties is  = {ij |1 i < jn}. The basic bundle of bidder i is i = {ij |i < jn} ∪{
ji |1j < i
}
. Since every pair of bidders’ basic bundles conﬂict, there is at most one
winner in the auction. By the constraints of market clearing price and the construction of
this auction, there is at most one satisﬁed loser. Hence S(An,n) = 2. 
Proof of Theorem 1. When c = 1, it is equivalent to Lemma 1.
When 0 < c < 1, we carry out the proof by a reduction from the decision problem of
Walrasian equilibrium.
For any single-minded auction (A,w) in which there are n bidders competing for m
commodities, we construct another auction (A′, w′) by introducing new bidders and com-
modities.
These new bidders and commodities are constructed as in the proof of Lemma 2: there
are n˜ bidders competing for m˜ = n˜(n˜ − 1)/2 commodities and only two bidders can be
satisﬁed. We can choose an appropriate n˜ such that
n+ 1
n+ n˜  c, (1)
n+ 2
n+ n˜ > c. (2)
Due to Eq. (2), n˜(n + 2 − cn)/c = O(n). Moreover, the number of commodities
m˜ = O(n˜2) = O(n2). Now we have constructed a new auction (A′, w′) whose size is a
polynomial of n. Clearly, S(A′, w′) = S(A,w)+ 2n+ 2.
If R(A′, w′) > c, there must be n satisﬁed bidders in (A,w) due to Eqs. (1) and (2).
Hence the auction admits a Walrasian equilibrium. On the other hand, if R(A′, w′)c, we
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can infer that S(A,w) < n, which implies that the Walrasian equilibrium does not exist in
the auction (A,w). Now the reduction is complete. 
4. Upper and lower bounds of R(A,w)
We have seen from Lemma 2 that R(A,w) can be as small as possible if the number of
commodities is much greater than the number of bidders. In the next proposition, we show
that even when the number of bidders and the number of commodities are approximately
equal, we still cannot promise any satisfactory lower bound for R(A,w).
Proposition 1. For any prime number p, we can construct a single-minded auction (A,w)
in which there are (p2+p+1) bidders and (p2+p+1) commodities such that S(A,w) =
(p + 1).
Proof. The idea of the proof is to construct an auction such that there is at most one winner
and p satisﬁed losers in any feasible allocation-pricing scheme.
In the language of matrix, we are seeking (A,w) with the following properties:
• 〈ai, aj 〉 = 1 for all 1 i, jn, i = j , i.e., every two bidders share one common
item;
• the number of 1’s in each row of A is p, i.e., each item is interested by p bidders;
• w = e, i.e., every bidder’s budget is 1.
The ﬁrst property ensures that there is at most one winner in any feasible allocation.
Assume bidder 1 wins and a1 = (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0)T in which the ﬁrst l entries are 1’s.
Assume P is the price vector which maximizes the number of satisﬁed bidders. By the
condition of market clearing price, only the ﬁrst l items of P are nonzero values. For a loser
j, if 〈a1, aj 〉 = 0, it cannot be satisﬁed because wj − 〈P, aj 〉 = wj = 1 > 0. Hence if
bidder j is a satisﬁed loser, we must have 〈a1, aj 〉 = 1. Assume the ﬁrst entry of aj is 1
and 2 to l entries are 0’s. By the deﬁnition of a satisﬁed loser, we have 〈P, aj 〉 = wj = 1
which implies P = (1, 0, . . . , 0)T. However, by the second property, there are at most p
losers who can be satisﬁed under this price vector because only p+1 bidders are interested
in the ﬁrst item. Therefore, these three properties guarantee that S(A,w) = p + 1.
Following the above discussions, we need only construct a 0–1 matrix A of dimension
(p2+p+1)×(p2+p+1)which satisﬁes: (1) the inner product of any two columns is 1; (2)
every row contains exactly (p+ 1) 1’s. However, it is a well-known result in combinatorial
designs (e.g. [1, p. 100]). 
In the rest of this section, we will study the lower bound of R by a greedy algorithm.And
then we will improve the bound by a more complicated analysis.
The following greedy algorithm gives us the ﬁrst lower bound estimation of R when
the size of each bidder’s basic bundle is uniformly bounded by a constant. For the ease of
description, we introduce some notations. LetNi(A) andNj(A) be the number of 1’s in ith
column and jth row of a 0–1matrixA, respectively. Denote by Ij (A) the set of bidders whose
basic bundles contain the jth commodity. For a set of bidders E, deﬁne MAX_BIDDER(E)
as the one whose bid is highest.
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Data : A single-minded auction (A,w)
Result : An allocation and price (x, p)
Set k = 0, Ak = A;
while Ak is not a zero matrix do
Set jk = argmaxj
{
Nj(Ak)
}
, i.e., ﬁnd the commodity which attracts most bidders;
Set ik = MAX_BIDDER(Ijk (Ak));
Set xik = 1, i.e., allocate to ik his basic bundle;
Set pjk , the price of commodity jk , to be wik , the budget of bidder ik;
Remove all bidders whose basic bundle conﬂicts bidder ik’s basic bundle, i.e., set
those columns which intersects aik to be zero. Denote the updated matrix asAk+1;
k=k+1
end
Algorithm 1. A greedy algorithm
Proposition 2. The algorithm ends with at least n/ satisﬁed bidders where is the bound
of the size of bidders’ basic bundles.
Proof. Assume in the kth iteration, item jk and bidder ik are selected. Without loss of
generality, let jk = 1 and ik’s basic bundle be
{
1,2, . . . ,k
}
. In this iteration of
the algorithm; we remove I1(A), I2(A), . . . , Ik (A) from the auction. Due to the pricing
scheme, all the bidders in I1(A) will be satisﬁed. Moreover, by the greedy step, we have
|I1(A)| max
{|I2(A)|, . . . , |Ik (A)|}. Hence at least 1/k of them can be satisﬁed. Then
the assumption k yields the approximation bound. 
Proposition 2 naturally implies R(A,w)1/m. The following theorem improves the
bound to 2/m.
Theorem 2. Let (A,w) be a single-minded auction in which n is the number of bidders
and m is the number of commodities, then R(A,w)2/m.
Proof. We divide the bidders into two categories: those who are interested in a single item
and those who are interested in multiple items. Deﬁne
I=1 =
{
1 in
∣∣∣∣
m∑
k=1
aik = 1
}
and
I2 =
{
1 in
∣∣∣∣
m∑
k=1
aik2
}
,
for these two categories, respectively.
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Next, we construct m collections of bidders:
Cj =
{
i ∈ I=1|aij+1 = 1 or aij+2 = 1
}
∪
{
i ∈ I2|aij = 1
}
, j = 1, 2, . . . , m.
We take module n if the subscript runs out of the range [1, n]. Clearly, ∑mj=1 |Cj |2n
since every bidder is counted at least twice. Then there exists a collection Cj such that
|Cj |2n/m. Without loss of generality, assume j = 1.
To complete the proof of the theorem, we prove that all bidders in C1 can be satisﬁed
under some feasible allocation-pricing scheme.
Split C1 into the union of six subsets:
I{1} =
{
i ∈ C1|ai1 = 1, ai2 = ai3 = 0
}
,
I{2} =
{
i ∈ C1|ai1 = ai3 = 0, ai2 = 1
}
,
I{3} =
{
i ∈ C1|ai1 = ai2 = 0, ai3 = 1
}
,
I{1,2} =
{
i ∈ C1|ai1 = ai2 = 1, ai3 = 0
}
,
I{1,3} =
{
i ∈ C1|ai1 = ai3 = 1, ai2 = 0
}
,
I{1,2,3} =
{
i ∈ C1|ai1 = ai2 = ai3 = 1
}
.
For a subset IB of the above six, denote by iB the bidder with the highest bid in IB
and wB for his budget. Deﬁne w¯{1,2} = w{1,2} − w{2}, w¯{1,3} = w{1,3} − w{3}, w¯{1,2,3} =
w{1,2,3} − w{2} − w{3}. Then set the price of 1, 2 and 3 by
p1 =max
{
w{1}, w¯{1,2}, w¯{1,3}, w¯{1,2,3}
}
,
p2 =w{2},
p3 =w{3}.
If p1 = w{1}, then sell to i{1}, i{2} and i{3} their basic bundles, respectively,
If p1 = w{1,2}, then sell to i{1,2} and i{3} their basic bundles, respectively,
If p1 = w{1,3}, then sell to i{1,3} and i{2} their basic bundles, respectively,
If p1 = w{1,2,3}, then sell to i{1,2,3} his basic bundle.
By the construction of the price assignment, we can ensure that every bidder in C1 is
satisﬁed. 
Remark 1. Wecanconstruct an auction (A,w)with three commodities such thatR(A,w)=
2/3 (e.g. Example 1). Therefore, the bound in Theorem 2 is tight when m = 3.
5. Conclusion and discussion
We deﬁne a ratio R in single-minded auctions to provide an alternative for the scenario
where Walrasian equilibrium does not exist. We give a general lower bound for R by a
constructive proof which can yield at least 2n/m satisﬁed bidders. We also give several
upper bounds by illustrating some interesting instances (Lemma 2 and Proposition 1).
Hinted by these two instances, we conjecture that the general lower bound can be raised
from 2/m to (1/
√
m).
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In reality, we may need to consider weighted satisfaction problem to emphasize the
different importance of bidders. Furthermore, we may also need to extend the problem to
general combinatorial auctions rather than single-minded auctions.
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